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Abstract—We investigate the secure degrees of freedom (SDoF)
of a two-transmitter Gaussian multiple access channel with
multiple antennas at the transmitters, the legitimate receiver
with the existence of an unknown number of eavesdroppers each
with a number of antennas less than or equal to a known value
NE . The channel matrices between the legitimate transmitters
and the receiver are available everywhere, while the legitimate
pair does not know the eavesdroppers’ channels matrices. We
provide the exact sum SDoF for the considered system. A new
comprehensive upperbound is deduced and a new achievable
scheme based on utilizing jamming is exploited. We prove
that Cooperative Jamming is SDoF optimal even without the
instantaneous eavesdropper CSI available at the transmitters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The noisy wiretap channel was first studied by Wyner [1],
in which a legitimate transmitter (Alice) wishes to send a
message to a legitimate receiver (Bob), and hide it from
an eavesdropper (Eve). Wyner proved that Alice can send
positive secure rate using channel coding. He derived capacity-
equivocation region for the degraded wiretap channel. Later,
Csiszar and Korner found capacity-equivocation the region for
the general wiretap channel [2], which was extended to the
Gaussian wiretap channel by Leung-Yan- Cheong and Hellman
[3].
A significant amount of work was carried thereafter to
study the information theoretic physical layer security for
different network models. The relay assisted wiretap channel
was studied in [4]. The secure degrees of freedom (SDoF)
region of multiple access channel (MAC) was presented in
[15]. The SDoF is the the pre-log of the secrecy capacity
region in the high-SNR regime. Using MIMO systems for
securing the message was an intuitive extension due to the
spatial gain provided by multiple antennas. The MIMO wiretap
channel was studied in [5]–[9], [12], [13] and the secrecy
capacity was identified in [8].
Meanwhile, the idea of cooperative jamming was proposed
in [9], where some of the users transmit independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noise towards the eaves-
dropper to improve the sum secrecy rate. Cooperative jamming
was used for deriving the SDoF for different networks. In [15],
cooperative jamming was used to jam the eavesdropper and
proved that the K-user MAC with single antenna nodes can
achieve K(K−1)K(K−1)+1 SDoF.
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In this paper, we study the MIMO MAC channel with
unknown number of eavesdroppers where the eavesdroppers
channel coefficients are not available at the legitimate trans-
mitters and receiver, but only second order statistics of the
eavesdropper channel is available. The motivation emanates
from the fact that the passive eavesdroppers instantaneous and
exact CSI is hard to obtain because the eavesdropper is passive.
It is essential to determine the Secure DoF under other differ-
ent forms of the CSI availability, e.g statistical, alternating or
no CSI. It is easy to prove that if the eavesdropper channel
is completely unknown, then the secrecy capacity is equal to
zero. The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel with
known CSI is an upperbound for these channel given equal
number of antennas at both transmitting and receiving sides,
which is in turn upperbounded as
I(Wt;Y )− I(Wt;Z) (1)
where Wt is the set of messages to be transmitted, Y is the
legitimate receiver signal and Z is the eavesdropper signal.
So for identifying the secrecy capacity and building a positive
rate secure code for the no CSI case, it must be proven first
that I(Wt;Z) < I(Wt;Y ) which is not possible if the channel
is completely unknown.
The major contributions of our work as compared to existing
literature can be summarized as follows:
• We present the sum SDoF of the multiple access channel
with unknown fading eavesdroppers channels.
• We present the sum SDoF of the multiple access channel
with known eavesdropper channels with constant or time
varying channels, closing an open problem since the best
known achievable region was presented in [17]. we show
that it has the same sum SDoF as the previous unknown
fading channels case.
• our work incorporates the more general scenario of
multiple eavesdroppers.
• We study the more comprehensive case where all the
eigenvalues of the legitimate channel has non-zero val-
ues1.
• we deduce a new upperbound on the SDoF and provide
an optimal scheme that achieves the new upperbound.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the
system model and the secrecy constraints. The main results are
1The cases where some of the eigenvalues are equal to zero represent special
degraded cases of the more general non-zero eigenvalues case, where the
SDoF decreases for every zero eigenvalue till it collapses to the trivial case
of zero SDoF for all-zero eigenvalues.
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presented in Section III. In Section IV, the new upperbound is
derived and the achievable scheme is presented in Section V.
The paper is concluded in Section VI. We use the following
notation, a for vectors, A for matrices, A† for the hermitian
transpose of A, [A]+ for the maxA, 0 and Null(A) to define
the nullspace of A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a communication system of two transmitters
and a single receiver in vicinity of an unknown number of
passive eavesdroppers. Transmitters one and two are equipped
with M1 and M2 antennas, respectively. The legitimate re-
ceiver is equipped with N antennas, while the jth eavesdrop-
per is equipped with NEj ≤ NE antennas, where NE is a
constant known to the eavesdroppers. Let xi denote the Mi×1
vector of symbols to be transmitted by transmitter i, where
i ∈ {1, 2}. We can write the received signal at the legitimate
receiver at time (sample) k as
Y(k) =
2∑
i=1
HiVixi(k) + n(k) (2)
and the received signal at the jth eavesdropper as
Zj(k) =
2∑
i=1
Gi,j(k)Vixi(k) + nEj(k), (3)
where Hi is the N × Mi matrix containing the channel
coefficients from transmitter i to the receiver, Gi,j(k) is the
NEj × Mi matrix containing the i.i.d time varying channel
coefficients from transmitter i to the eavesdropper j drawn
from a continuous distribution with mean η and variance
σ2e , Vi is the precoding unitary matrix (i.e. ViV
†
i = I) at
transmitter i, n(k) and nEj(k) are the N×1 and the NEj×1
additive white Gaussian noise vectors with zero mean and
variance σ2 at the legitimate receiver and the jth eavesdropper,
respectively. We assume that the transmitters do not know
any of the eavesdroppers’ channels Gi,j(k). We assume that
NE < M , where M = M1 +M2.
We define the Mi × 1 channel input from legitimate trans-
mitter i as
Xi(k) = Vixi(k). (4)
Each transmitter i intends to send a message Wi over n
channel uses (samples) to the legitimate receiver simultane-
ously while preventing the eavesdroppers from decoding its
message. The encoding occurs under a constrained power
given by
E
{
XiX
†
i
}
≤ P ∀i = 1, 2 (5)
Expanding the notations over n channel extensions
we have Hni = Hi(1),Hi(2), . . . ,Hi(n), G
n
i,j =
Gi,j(1),Gi,j(2), . . . ,Gi,j(n) and similarly the time extended
channel input, Xni , time extended channel output at legitimate
receiver, Yn and time extended channel output at eavesdropper
j, Znj as well as noise at legitimate receiver, n
n and noise at
eavesdroppers, nnEj .
At each transmitter, the message Wi is uniformly and
independently chosen from a set of possible secret messages
Fig. 1: System model
for transmitter i,Wi = {1, 2, . . . , 2nRi}. The rate for message
Wi is Ri , 1n log |Wi|, where | · | denotes the cardinality
of the set. Transmitter i uses a stochastic encoding function
fi : Wi −→ Xni to map the secret message into a transmitted
symbol. The receiver has a decoding function φ : Yn −→
(Wˆ1, Wˆ2), where Wˆi is an estimate of Wi.
Definition 1. A secure rate tuple (R1, R2) is said to be
achievable if for any  > 0 there exist n-length codes such
that the legitimate receiver can decode the messages reliably,
i.e.,
Pr{(W1,W2) 6= (Wˆ1, Wˆ2)} ≤  (6)
and the messages are kept information-theoretically secure
against the eavesdroppers, i.e.,
lim
n−→∞
1
n
H(W1,W2|Znj ) ≥ lim
n−→∞
1
n
H(W1,W2)−  (7)
where H(·) is the Entropy function and (7) implies the secrecy
for any subset S ⊂ {1, 2} of messages including individual
messages [15].
lim
n−→∞
1
n
H(Wi|Znj ) ≥ lim
n−→∞
1
n
H(Wi)−  ∀i = 1, 2 (8)
Definition 2. The sum SDoF is defined as
Ds = lim
P→∞
sup
∑
i
Ri
1
2 logP
, (9)
where the supremum is over all achievable secrecy rate tuples
(R1, R2), Ds = d1 + d2, and d1 and d2 are the secure DoF
of transmitters one and two, respectively.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Theorem 1. The sum SDoF of the two user MAC channel is
Ds =

M −NE C1
1
2
max(M1, N) +
1
2
max(M2, N)− 12NE C2
N C3
(10)
where the conditions C1, C2 and C3 are given by:
C1 :M ≤ N
or M1 < N,M > N and NE ≥ 2(M −N)
or M1 > N,M2 < N and NE ≥ [M1 −N + 2M2]
C2 :M1 < N and NE < 2(M −N)
or M1 > N,M2 < N and M1 −N ≤ NE < [M1 −N + 2M2]
or M1 > N,M2 ≥ N and NE ≥M − 2N
C3 : NE < [M1 −N ]+ + [M2 −N ]+
Proof: To prove the theorem, we deduce the converse in
Section IV and provide the achievable scheme in Section V.
IV. CONVERSE
Theorem 2. The number of SDoF of the two user MAC
channel is upperbound as,
Ds≤min(N,M1+M2−NE , 1
2
(max(M1, N)+max(M2, N)−NE))
(11)
Proof: The first bound is the due to limited number of
antennas at the receiver which limits the SDoF as
Ds ≤ N (12)
The second bound represent the DoF loss caused by the
number of eavesdroppers’ antennas on the transmitter side,
without loss of generality, we provide an upperbound for the
case of existence of only one eavesdropper with NE antennas.
The SDoF of the single eavesdropper case is certainly an
upperbound for the multiple eavesdroppers case, as increasing
the number of eavesdroppers can only reduce the SDoF of
the legitimate users. We omit the eavesdropper subscript for
simplicity of notation. Suppose that we can added |M −N |+
antennas to the receiver side that wont decrease the SDoF, the
sum rate is upperbounded by the rate of an equivalent MIMO
wiretap channel with (M1 +M2) transmit antennas as,
Rs ≤ max
Kx
log |(I + H11KxH†11)| − log |(I + GKxG†) (13)
As HH† and GG† are hermitian, they can be diagonal-
ized as GG† = UGΛGU
†
G, HH
† = UHΛHU
†
H , where
UGU
†
G = I and UGU
†
G = I. Without loss of generality, Let
V = [VLVN ], where VN contains the NEorthonormal basis
of G, while VL contains the M −NE basis of the orthogonal
complement of VN , and Kx = VΛKxV
†.
Ds≤ lim
P→∞
1
logP
(
max
Kx
[log |I + H11VΛKxV†H†11|
)
− log |I + UΛGU†VΛKxV†|]
≤ lim
P→∞
1
logP
(
max
ΛKx
log |ΛHΛKx | − log |ΛGΛKx | − C2
)
≤ lim
P→∞
1
logP
(
max
ΛKx
M1+M2∏
i=1
λiHλ
i
Kx −
NE∏
i=1
λiGλ
i
Kx
)
≤M1 +M2 −NE (14)
where λiKx is the ith diagonal value of ΛKx and similarly
defined λiG, λ
i
H , (14) is because log |I + AB| = log |I + BA|
Fig. 2: DoF-equivalent Z channel
for the above matrices, (14) is because lim
P→∞
log |I+B|
logP =
lim
P→∞
log |B|
logP for any matrix B, and because |AB| = |A||B|
for square matrices, and |VKx |, |VH |, |U| are independent of
P . All Ci : i∈{1,2} are constants independent of P . The third
bound represents the DoF loss of each transmitter due to the
number of eavesdroppers antennas available. Let d1e and d
2
e be
the degrees of freedom for the parts of the messages sent by
transmitter one and two, respectively, which can be decoded
by the eavesdropper. Note that
∑
i=1,2 di + d
2
e = M , because
the transmitters is assumed to be using all their M DoF, where
from the secure DoF perspective the DoF wasted a non secure
message is equivalent to non transmitting over those DoF.
Suppose that we can set all coefficients of G1 to zero to hide
all information sent by transmitter one from the eavesdropper,
so the resulting channel becomes identical to the Z channel of
Figure 2(b). However, setting G1 coefficients to zero cannot
decrease the performance of the coding scheme. Therefore,
the DoF tuple for the modified channel is upperbounded by
d1 + d2 + d
2
e ≤ max(M2, N) (15)
Similarly, using the modified Z channel in Figure 2(a),
d1 + d2 + d
1
e ≤ max(M1, N) (16)
Moreover, since the eavesdropper has NE antennas then,
d1e + d
2
e = NE (17)
where the LHS is strictly equal to the RHS because the
transmitter messages is occupying M > NE dimensions as
mentioned above. Combining (15), (16) and (17) we have,
Ds ≤ 1
2
(max(M1, N) + max(M2, N)−NE) (18)
From (12),(14) and (18), we have
Ds ≤ min
(
1
2
(max(M1, N) + max(M2, N)−NE),M −NE , N
)
(19)
V. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
For securing the legitimate messages, the transmitters uses a
two-step noise injection by simultaneously sending a jamming
signal and using a stochastic encoder as follows,
1) The transmitters send a jamming signal with power
P J = αP that guarantees that all eavesdropper have a
constant rate (o(logP )) for all legitimate signal power
values, where α is a constant controlled the transmitters
to adjust the jamming.
2) A stochastic encoder is built using random binning. The
encoder randomness is designed to be larger that any
of the post-jamming eavesdroppers leakage, hence all
eavesdroppers would have zero rate with the code length
goes to infinity meeting the secrecy constraints in (7).
The jamming signal transmitted is a NE vector r = [r1 r2]T
with random symbols using VJ1 and V
J
2 as jamming pre-
coders2. Hence, the transmitted coded signal can be broken
into legitimate signal, si, and jamming signal, ri, such that
xi =
[
si
ri
]
, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Accordingly, the precoder, Vi can be also broken into legiti-
mate precoder, VLi , and jamming precoder, V
J
i such that
Vi =
[
VLi V
J
i
]
i ∈ {1, 2}.
Choosing VJ to be the unitary matrix, the jamming power
becomes P J = E{tr(rir†i )} = αP , where α is a constant
controlled by the transmitter.
Proposition 1. The jamming signal, r, overwhelms all
eavesdroppers’ signal space, and all eavesdroppers end
up decoding zero DoF of the legitimate messages. The
transmitter then uses a stochastic encoder to satisfy the
secrecy constraint in (7)
Let R¯e = I(Z; s1, s2) be the rate of the eavesdropper
with the best channel assuming it also has NE antennas. Let
Re = I(Z; W1,W2) be the legitimate message rate of the
same eavesdropper, where Re < R¯e because of the stochastic
encoder used. let R¯ej be the rate of the jth eavesdropper.
Then R¯ej ≤ R¯e∀j ∈ L, where L is the unknown number of
eavesdroppers.
Proof:
nR¯e ≤ I(Zn; sn1 , sn2 )
= h(Zn)− h(Zn|sn1 , sn2 )
R¯e ≤ NElogP −NElogP J + C
≤ NElogP −NElogαP + C
≤ C = o(logP ) (20)
where C is a constant that does not depend on P and known
to the transmitter.
Remark 1. The constant eavesdropper rate comes from the
fact that P J is controlled by the transmitter. Hence, setting
P J = αP , a constant SNR is guaranteed at the eavesdroppers
and a constant rate independent of P . For the case of the con-
stant known eavesdropper channel or unknown fading channel
with known statistics, the constant C is known transmitter.
The transmitters use the rate difference to transmit perfectly
secure messages using a stochastic encoder similar to the one
described in [17] according to the strongest eavesdropper’s
rate, C, in worst case scenario to achieve the secrecy constraint
2For the special case NE = 1, only one user sends a single jamming
symbol.
in 7 . Let
Ci ∈ C(Rti, Ri, n)∀i = 1, 2 (21)
denote a Wyner code of size 2nR
t
i to encode a confidential
message set Wi = {1, 2, ..., 2nRi} of transmitter i, where
Rti ≥ Ri and n is the codeword length. Therefore, there are
two rates that define the Wyner code, the legitimate channel
code rate Rti and the secure message rate Ri. As a result,
the rate Rl = Rti − Ri is the cost of secrecy or the rate lost
to secure the legitimate message. Rl defines the amount of
randomness added in a Wyner code. For a Wyner code, if
Rˆe = Rl, then the eavesdropper cannot decode the secure
message sent (i.e limn−→∞ 1nRe ≤ ). The Wyner code
C(Rti, Ri, N) is built using random binning [18]. We gen-
erate 2nR
t
i codewords sni (wi, vi), where wi = 1, 2, ..., 2
nRi ,
and vi = 1, 2, ..., 2n(R
t
i−Ri), by choosing the 2nR
t
i symbols
si(wi, vi) independently at random according to the input
distribution p(si). Then we distribute them randomly into
2nRi bins such that each bin contains 2n(R
t
i−Ri) codewords.
The stochastic encoder of C(Rti, Ri, N) is described by a
matrix of conditional probabilities so that, given wi ∈ Wi,
we randomly and uniformly select a codeword to transmit
from the bin wi or in other words, we select vi from
{1, 2, ..., 2n(Rti−Ri)} and transmit sni (wi, vi). We assume that
the legitimate receiver employs a typical-set decoder. Given
the received signal yn, the legitimate receiver tries to find a
pair (wˆ, vˆ) so that sn(wˆ, vˆ) and yn are jointly typical [18].
We set Ri = I(si,Y) − I(si,Z) −  and Rti = I(si,Y) − .
The error probability and equivocation calculations are straight
forward extensions of similar Wyner random binning encoders
( [18], [19]).
H(Wi
n) = I(sni ; Y
n)− I(sni ; Zn)−m (22)
H(Wi
n|Zn) = I(sni ; Yn|Zn)− I(sni ; Zn|Zn)− n (23)
= I(sni ; Y
n,Zn)− I(sni ,Zn)− n (24)
≥ H(Win)− n (25)
(26)
and,
H(W1
n,W2
n|Zn) = H(W1n|Zn) +H(W2n|Zn)(27)
≥ H(W1n) +H(W2n)− 2n (28)
≥ H(W1n,W2n)− 2n (29)
2∑
i=1
Ri≥ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I +
2∑
i=1
(UHiV
L
i sis
†
iV
L†
i H
†
iU
†)
∣∣∣∣∣−Re
(30)
As limn−→∞ 1nRe ≤  for all values of Gi and P , a positive
secrecy rate, which is monotonically increasing with P , is
achieved. Computing the secrecy degrees of freedom boils
down to calculating the degrees of freedom for the first term
in the right hand side of (30), which represents the receiver
DoF after jamming is applied.
With the eavesdroppers completely blocked, it remains to
show how the jamming signal directions are designed to
Fig. 3: The intersection of signal spaces at the receiver
achieve the maximum possible secure DoF. First, we study the
secure DoF for M ≤ N , then go for M > N with different
regions of the relations between (M1,M2, N,NE).
A. Achievability for M ≤ N
For this region, transmitters one and two send the jamming
signals using precoders VJ1 and V
J
2 , with dimensions J1 and
J2, respectively, such that J1 + J2 = NE .
Random jamming: The jamming precoders and symbols
are randomly chosen. We call this method random jamming.
The receiver zero-forces the jamming signal using the
post-processing matrix U as in (31). Accordingly, M − NE
secure DoF can be sent. Since N ≥ M , the receiver can
decode M −NE DoF after zero-forcing the jamming signal.
U = [I− aa−1] (31)
where
a = H1V
J
1 + H2V
J
2 (32)
B. Achievability for M > N
For this region we use three methods for jamming, aligned
jamming, nullspace jamming and random jamming. As ran-
dom jamming was described above, the other two will be
explained in the following.
Aligned jamming: The jamming signals of both transmitters
are aligned at the legitimate receiver signal space. Let I be
the jamming space at the receiver. Each transmitter aligns a
part or the whole of its jamming signal into this jamming
space. The total signal space of transmitter one and transmitter
two occupies only M1 and M2 dimensions, receptively, at
the receiver. These two spaces are distinct if M1 < N , so
a common space is needed to direct the jamming signal into.
Let A1 and A2 span the received signal spaces of transmitter
one and two at the receiver, I is chosen to be the intersection
of these two spaces, i.e.,
I = A1
⋂
A2. (33)
I would have positive size only if M ≥ N [21]. Without loss
of generality, we design VJ1 and V
J
2 such that,
H1V
J
1 = H2V
J
2 = I (34)
While the system of equations in ((34)) has more variables
than the number of equations, (33) ensures that the system
has a unique solution as I lies in the spans of H1 and H2.
Let
Hi =
[
H
′
i
H
′′
i
]
∀ i = 1, 2, (35)
where H′i contains the Mi rows of Hi and H
′′
i contains the
other N −Mi rows.
Let
I =
[
I ′i
I ′′i
]
∀ i = 1, 2, (36)
where I ′i contains the Mi rows of I and I ′′i contains the
other N −Mi rows.
Therefore, we can choose the following design which sat-
isfies (34)
VJ1 = (H
′
1)
−1I ′1 (37)
VJ2 = (H
′
2)
−1I ′2 (38)
For the legitimate receiver to remove the jamming signal and
decode the legitimate message, it zero forces the jamming
signal using the post-processing matrix U as in (31).
For the case NE is odd, each transmitter will align its jam-
ming signal into an bNE2 c–dimensional half space using linear
alignment. The remaining 1dimensional space will be equally
shared between the two transmitters’ jamming signal using
real interference alignment [16], yielding each transmitter’s
jamming signal to occupy NE2 .
Nullspace jamming: In nullspace jamming method, trans-
mitter one sends a jamming signal of J1 dimensions using the
precoder VJ1 which lies in the nullspace of the channel H1,
while transmitter two sends a jamming signal of J2 dimensions
using the precoder VJ2 which lies in the nullspace of the
channel H2.
VJi = Null(Hi)i ∈ 1, 2 (39)
This blocks J1 + J2 dimensions at the eavesdropper and
leaves N free dimensions at the legitimate receiver to attain
the legitimate signal in addition to other jamming if needed.
Case M1 < N and NE ≥ 2(M −N):
In this region, aligned jamming and random jamming are
used. The first transmitter signal is divided into two parts
of sizes J1 and J2 , The first part uses aligned jamming
precoder with J1 = min(NE2 ,M −N), or J1 = (M − N),
while the second part uses random jamming precoder with
J2 = [NE − 2J1]+. The second transmitter jamming signal
size is J1 and uses aligned jamming precoder. This scheme
wastes 2J1 + J2 = NE dimensions of the transmitters signal
space for jamming, so they can transmit at M − NE DoF
to the receiver. On the other hand, the jamming occupies
Js = J1 + J2 dimensions at the receiver.
Lemma 1. For the scheme proposed in the case M1 <
N and NE ≥ 2(M − N), a sufficient condition for the
receiver to decode the transmitted M − NE DoF is given
by N − Js ≥M −NE .
Proof:
Js = J1 + J2
Js = NE − J1
Js = NE −M +N
N − Js = N −NE +M −N
N − Js = M −NE .
Thus, M −NE is achievable.
Case M1 < N and NE < 2(M −N):
In this region, aligned jamming is used alone with both
transmitters jamming signals sizes set to J1 = NE2 . Conse-
quently, the receiver loses Js = NE2 dimensions because of
the jamming.
The achievable SDoF for this region is
d1 + d2 = min
(
N − NE
2
,M −NE
)
Considering that in this case M1 < N and NE < 2(M −N),
we get
d1 + d2 = N − NE
2
,
which can be rewritten as
d1 + d2 =
max(M1, N) + max(M2, N)−NE
2
(40)
Case M1 > N and NE < M1 −N + [M2 −N ]+:
In this region, nullspace jamming is used alone. Transmitter
one sends J1 = min(NE ,M1 − N) dimensional jamming
signal and transmitter two sends J2 = NE − J1 dimensional
jamming signal in the null spaces of the legitimate receiver
channels. This leaves the receiver with N jamming free
dimensions to decode the N SDoF transmitted. Consequently,
the upperbound N is achieved.
Case M1 > N,M2 < N and NE ≥ [M1 −N + 2M2]:
In this region, all three jamming methods are used, the first
transmitter jamming signal is divided into three parts of sizes
J1 = [M1−N ]+, J2 = min(M2, NE−J12 ), which is equivalent
to J2 = M2, and J3 = NE − (J1 + J2). While the second
transmitter jamming signal size is J2. The first transmitter uses
nullspace jamming, aligned jamming and random jamming
for its three parts, respectively. The second transmitter uses
aligned jamming only. This scheme uses NE dimensions of
the transmitters signal space, so they can transmit at M −NE
DoF to the receiver. On the other hand, the jamming occupies
Js = J2 + J3 dimensions at the receiver.
Lemma 2. Using the proposed achievable scheme under the
case M1 > N,M2 < N and NE ≥ [M1 − N + 2M2], the
condition N − Js ≥ M − NE is achieved, which implies
that the legitimate signal and the jamming spaces are not
overlapping.
Proof:
J2 = M2
J3 = NE − [(M1 −N) + 2M2]
Js = NE − [(M1 −N) +M2]
N − Js = N −NE +M1 −N +M2
N − Js = M −NE
Case M1 > N,M2 < N and M1 −N ≤ NE < (M1 −N +
2M2):
In this region, two jamming methods are used, the first
transmitter jamming signal is divided into two parts of sizes
J1 = [M1 − N ]+, J2 = min(M2, NE−J12 ), while the second
user jamming signal size is J2. The first transmitter uses
nullspace jamming for its first part and aligned jamming for
the second part, which is aligned to the second transmitter’s
jamming signal at the receiver. The jamming occupies Js = J2
dimensions at the receiver.
Lemma 3. For the proposed scheme under the case M1 >
N,M2 < N and M1 − N ≤ NE < (M1 − N + 2M2), the
achievable secure degrees of freedom is given by
d1 + d2 ≤ max(M1, N) + max(M2, N)−NE
2
(41)
Proof:
Js =
NE − [M1 −N ]
2
N − Js = N − NE − [M1 −N ]
2
N − Js = 2N −NE + [M1 −N ]
2
N − Js = N −NE +M1
2
Thus,
d1 + d2 ≤ min(M −NE , N −NE +M1
2
)
d1 + d2 ≤ N −NE +M1
2
,
which can be rewritten as,
d1 + d2 ≤ max(M1, N) + max(M2, N)−NE
2
.
Case M1 > N,M2 ≥ N and NE ≥M − 2N :
In this region, two jamming methods are used. Each transmit-
ter jamming signal is divided into two parts of sizes
J1,i = Mi −N, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}
J2 =
NE −
∑
i∈{1,2} J1,i
2
.
Both transmitters use nullspace jamming for their first part and
aligned jamming for the second part. The jamming occupies
Js = J2 dimensions at the receiver.
Lemma 4. For the proposed scheme under case M1 >
N,M2 ≥ N and NE ≥ M − 2N , the achievable secure
degrees of freedom is
d1 + d2 ≤ max(M1, N) + max(M2, N)−NE
2
(42)
Proof:
Js =
NE − (M1 −N +M2 −N)
2
N − Js = N − NE − [M − 2N ]
2
N − Js = 2N −NE +M − 2N
2
N − Js = M −NE
2
.
Thus,
d1 + d2 ≤ M −NE
2
, (43)
which can be rewritten as
d1 + d2 ≤ max(M1, N) + max(M2, N)−NE
2
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the two-transmitter Gaussian multiple access
wiretap channel with multiple antennas at the transmitters,
legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. Generalizing new up-
perbound was established and a new achievable scheme was
provided. We used the new optimal scheme to derive the sum
secure DoF of the channel. We showed that the our scheme
meets the upperbound or all M1,M2, NE combinations. We
showed that Cooperative Jamming is SDoF optimal even
without the eavesdropper CSI available at the transmitters by
showing that jamming signal independent of the eavesdropper
channel and only depends on the signal transmitted power
make the eavesdropper decoded DoF. Finally we showed that
if any eavesdropper has more antennas that the sum of the
transmitting antennas or the receiving antennas the SDoF is
zero.
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